PoisHygiene: Detecting and Mitigating Poisoning Attacks in Neural
  Networks by Guo, Junfeng et al.
PoisHygiene: Detecting and Mitigating Poisoning Attacks in Neural Networks
Junfeng Guo†, Ting Wang∗ and Cong Liu†
†The University of Texas at Dallas ∗ The Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
The black-box nature of deep neural networks (DNNs) facil-
itates attackers to manipulate the behavior of DNN through
data poisoning. Being able to detect and mitigate poisoning at-
tacks, typically categorized into backdoor and adversarial poi-
soning (AP), is critical in enabling the safe adoption of DNNs
in many application domains. Although recent works demon-
strate encouraging results on the detection of certain backdoor
attacks, they exhibit inherent limitations which may signif-
icantly constrain the applicability. Indeed, it is still under-
studied on how to detect AP attacks, which represent a more
daunting challenge given that such attacks exhibit no explicit
rules compared to backdoor attacks (i.e., embedding backdoor
triggers into poisoned data).
In this paper, we present PoisHygiene, the first detection
and mitigation framework against AP attacks. PoisHygiene
is fundamentally motivated by Dr. Ernest Rutherford’s story
(i.e., the 1908 Nobel Prize winner), on observing the struc-
ture of atom through random electron sampling. Similarly,
PoisHygiene crafts test inputs to a given DNN, seeking to
reveal necessary internal properties of the decision region
space belonging to each label and detect whether a label is
infected. Through extensive implementation and evaluation of
PoisHygiene against a set of state-of-the-art AP attacks on four
widely studied datasets, PoisHygiene proves to be effective
and robust under various settings considering complex attack
variants. Interestingly, PoisHygiene is also shown to be ef-
fective and robust on detecting backdoor attacks, particularly
comparing to state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods in-
cluding Neural Cleanse and ABS.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being deployed in a myr-
iad of application domains, such as image classification [23],
object recognition [34], and security-critical ones including
binary reverse engineering [11], malware detection [4, 42],
and autonomous driving [7]. Unfortunately, the black-box
nature of DNN models may enable attackers to manipulate
the model through data poisoning, which seeks to manipu-
late the behavior of DNN via inserting poisoned samples
during training [9, 17, 21, 27, 37]. Poisoning attacks have at-
tracted intensive recent attention from both academia and
industry, which can be generally categorized into backdoor
attacks [9, 12, 17, 27, 45] and adversarial poisoning (AP) at-
tacks [21, 36, 37, 39] (as also discussed in [41]). A key differ-
ence is that backdoor attacks seek to attach specific triggers
to training data, which override normal classification to pro-
duce incorrect prediction results; while AP attacks aim at
either simply mislabeling training data or inserting poisoned
instances containing manipulated features that belong to a
class different from the original one (note that such features
do not need to form a unified pattern as required by the trigger
implementation under backdoor attacks).
Compared with the intensive research on poisoning at-
tacks, it is still under-studied on how to detect such attacks
[9, 41]. A recent set of works focus on detecting backdoor
attacks [6, 28, 29, 36]), yet assuming the defender can access
the original poisoned instances used during training, which is
unfortunately impractical [9, 17, 27]. Recent works, i.e., Neu-
ral Cleanse [41] and ABS [26], take significant steps in the
direction of detection on backdoor attacks in the image classi-
fication domain, which do not require such strong defender
capability. The intuitive ideas behind Neural Cleanse [41]
and ABS [26] are through observing and exploiting proper-
ties unique to certain backdoor attack techniques (backdoor
trigger size for Neural Cleanse and compromised neurons
representing the features of backdoor triggers for ABS), thus
constraining their applicability to AP attacks.
We believe for any detection method on AP attacks to be
effective and robust, it has to be capable of observing and
leveraging unique poisoning-induced properties within an in-
fected DNN model (instead of properties specific to certain
attack techniques), which is clearly challenging. The chal-
lenges are due to the fact that it is rather difficult to observe
internal properties of DNN (infected or not) due to its black-
box nature and to leverage such properties in developing
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detection methods against AP attacks which do not exhibit
any common and explicit rules in the crafted poisoned data
(unlike backdoor triggers).
In this paper, we present PoisHygiene, the first detection
and mitigation framework against AP attacks. PoisHygiene
detects infected DNNs via observing and exploring an essen-
tial property of any infected DNN model due to poisoning,
i.e., the existence of a poisoned region w.r.t. each infected
label. PoisHygiene is fundamentally motivated by Dr. Ernest
Rutherford’s story (i.e., the 1908 Nobel Prize winner) [1], on
seeking the structure and content of atom through random
electron sampling. Similarly, a key design rationale behind
PoisHygiene is to craft random samples (sampled from Gaus-
sian distribution) as inputs to a given DNN, seeking to reveal
essential internal properties of the decision region space be-
longing to each label. Intuitively, for each label, PoisHygiene
smartly crafts inputs which could reach the poisoned region
(if one exists), through manipulating and evaluating the corre-
sponding loss functions (e.g., cross entropy loss).
Through extensive implementation and evaluation of
PoisHygiene against three state-of-the-art AP attacks [37,39] (
[39] proposes two AP attacks) on four widely studied datasets,
PoisHygiene proves to be effective and robust under various
settings. Rather interestingly, PoisHygiene is also shown to be
effective against state-of-the-art backdoor attacks [9, 17, 27].
Such efficacy is particularly demonstrated via direct compari-
son against Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS [26] on detection
against backdoor attacks for several complex attack variants.
Such generality is intuitive as PoisHygiene’s detection criteria
are developed through exploring essential properties of any
poisoned region, which may hold for both AP- and backdoor-
infected labels.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• We present effective detection and mitigation techniques
against state-of-the-art AP attacks, which are proved to
be effective by extensive experiments.
• Evaluation also demonstrates the efficacy of PoisHygiene
against existing backdoor attacks, particularly compar-
ing to the state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods
Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS [26] (e.g., under the multi-
infected-label setting).
• PoisHygiene is shown to be robust when considering a
set of complex attack variants under both AP and back-
door attacks. PoisHygiene is also shown to be resilient
against attacks that are fully aware of the specific defense
mechanisms used by PoisHygiene.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to de-
velop robust detection and mitigation techniques against AP
attacks (e.g., Sting Ray [39] and Poison Frog [37]), as well
as backdoor attacks with complex attack variants (e.g, with
multiple infected labels), which could not be resolved using
any existing defense techniques.
2 Background and Related Work
Due to a lack of transparency, DNNs are often treated as black-
box systems. A DNN model takes an input (e.g. an image)
and then gives a prediction label after performing a series of
internal computations.
Poisoning attacks. Poisoning attacks on DNNs are typically
categorized into backdoor attacks and AP attacks [41], both
of which have received a significant amount of recent atten-
tion [8, 24, 27, 37, 38, 41, 44]. Backdoor attack on DNNs is
defined to be training a backdoor trigger (e.g., a small white
square) into a DNN, causing anomalous behaviors when the
specific trigger is attached into a test-time input. [9, 17, 27].
An advantage of backdoor attacks is that they do not affect
overall classification accuracy on clean input data. On the
other hand, AP attack techniques seek to maliciously train
a DNN using data of certain classes whose features are in-
consistent with their assigned labels. Thus, at inference time,
the classification result on unmodified test data of those spe-
cific classes would be incorrect (e.g., a stop sign would be
misclassified as a speed limit sign ) [37, 39]. AP attacks can
be further categorized into integrity attack [37, 39] and avail-
ability attack [5, 21, 36]. An integrity attack aims at causing
specific mispredictions at inference time while preserving the
overall accuracy performance. An availability attack seeks to
lower the overall accuracy performance.
Regarding AP attacks, this paper focuses on integrity at-
tacks since availability attacks would cause the infected
model’s performance to significantly drop, thus making the de-
tection problem non-significant under our adversarial model
(see Sec. 2). In practice, AP attacks could be rather threat-
ening and easily implementable compared to backdoor at-
tacks [9, 17, 27], due to (i) backdoor attacks typically exhibit
the same shortcomings as evasion attacks [16, 22] where test-
time instances are required to be modified, and (ii) technically,
attackers could simply mislabel data during training to imple-
ment effective AP attacks [39].
Related Works on AP and Backdoor attacks. AP attack is
considered to be a practical and easily implementable type of
poisoning attacks in reality. AP attack requires fewer assump-
tions regarding the attacker’s capability compared to back-
door attacks [37, 39] while preserving overall high accuracy
on normal test-time inputs. Besides the common implementa-
tion of generating attacks through mislabeling training data
[39], recent works on performing clean-label attacks which
do not even require attackers to mislabel training data, includ-
ing StingRay [39] and Poison Frog [37]. StingRay generates
poisoning data that collides with adversarial images in the fea-
ture space, achieving > 98% attack success rate. Motivated
by StingRay, Poison Frog [37] seeks to add perturbations con-
taining features of the targeted infected label to yield poisoned
data instances, which appear to be visually-indistinguishable
from the corresponding original images. Poison Frog can
achieve > 99% attack success rate under a more restricted
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attack model. The clean-label property clearly makes such
AP attacks be more threatening in practice.
Regarding backdoor attacks, a recent set of attacks have
been proposed, including BadNets [17], Trojan Attack [27],
and Chen et al attack (denoted as “Chen Attack” throughout
this paper) [9], which assume a stronger adversarial capability
compared to AP attacks. BadNets [17] requires attackers to ac-
cess the training dataset and inject poisoned data attached with
arbitrary triggers. The trojan attack, which doesn’t require at-
tackers to access the training dataset, can achieve high attack
success rate > 98% with fewer inserted poisoned instances.
Chen attack, which is built under an adversarial model with
weaker adversarial capability, injects random noise with cer-
tain transparency ratio as the backdoor trigger which overlaps
with the entire image, can achieve > 99% attack success rate
with a few poisoned data instances. Yao [45] proposes a latent
backdoor attack, which inserts a hidden trigger into a teacher
model and this trigger can then be inherited by the student
model through transfer learning, which does not apply to our
attack model.
Existing detection methods against poisoning. A very re-
cent set of works have been proposed to detect and miti-
gate backdoor attacks without accessing the original train-
ing dataset [24, 25, 41]. A fine-pruning method [24] was first
proposed to remove backdoor by pruning neurons, which
imposes trivial impact on prediction results given clean test
inputs. Neural Cleanse [41], however, reports that this fine-
pruning method may significantly reduce the classification
accuracy on the GTSRB dataset. Neuron Trojan [25] presents
three computation expensive methods to defend backdoor at-
tacks, yet with rather limited evaluation only using the MNIST
dataset. Note that both Fine-Pruning and Neuron Trojan focus
on mitigation but not detection as they assume that a given
model is already known to be poisoned.
Indeed, the problem of detecting poisoning attacks is sig-
nificant and challenging. Trojan Attack [27] provides broad
discussions on several possible detection methods against
backdoor attacks; yet Chen et al. [9] show that a variety of
these detection methods may fail in practice. To the best of
our knowledge, Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS [26] repre-
sent the state-of-the-art detection and mitigation techniques
which can effectively detect and mitigate certain backdoor
attacks (i.e. BadNets and Trojan Attack) for image classifica-
tion models.1 Unfortunately, such detection methods exhibit
limitations which may significantly constrain the applicabil-
ity to AP attacks and backdoor attacks using more complex
attack variants (e.g., failing to detect multiple infected labels
as shown in our evaluation).
Regarding defenses against AP attacks, prior works mainly
1Note that there exist a couple of recent works on detecting backdoor
attacks [8, 18], which are incrementally built upon Neural Cleanse, thus
exhibiting the same limitations and inabilities as Neural Cleanse in detect-
ing backdoor and AP attacks. Also, insufficient evaluation is seen in the
manuscripts.
focus on sanitizing the poisoned training set and filtering poi-
soned samples [5,21,30,35,38]. However, such works are not
applicable to our adversarial model (see Sec 3) where the de-
tector shall not have access to the original training set which
may contain poisoned instances. Under our more realistic
adversarial model, unfortunately, there does not exist any de-
tection and mitigation methods against AP attacks. As briefly
discussed in [41], a fundamental challenge due to AP attacks
is that different from backdoor attacks, AP attacks implement
no unified rules (e.g., poisoned samples sharing the same
trigger or common image properties on crating adversarial
training data. Such unified rules are fundamentally observed
and utilized in Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS [26], which
perform a reverse engineering-based method that could iden-
tify the backdoor trigger. However, such observations do not
hold for AP attacks because the poisoned training instances
may not share any common feature. The poisoned training
instances can be any images belonging to different classes
and may not exhibit any feature in common (e.g., pixel, size,
shape, etc.).
3 Adversarial Model
Attack Model. Our attack model is consistent with that of
Neural Cleanse and ABS [26, 41]. Specifically, the attacker
is assumed to fully control the DNN model, and be able to
insert any type of poisoned data into the training dataset to
achieve high attack success rate. A user may obtain such a
DNN model which exhibits state-of-the-art performance yet
being infected by backdoor or AP attacks. Due to the fact
that the poisoned data was used at the training phase, the
user and the defender do not have access to such data. Any
infected DNN model still performs generally well on clean
test data yet exhibits targeted mis-classification when being
tested with certain adversarial inputs, e.g., inputs of certain
classes under adversarial poisoning or inputs being attached
with a backdoor trigger, which guarantees the evasiveness of
the vulnerabilities upon such infected models.
A label (class) is considered infected if certain inputs (ei-
ther with backdoor triggers due to backdoor attacks or without
any unique trigger due to AP attacks) cause targeted misclas-
sification to that label. In practice, there may exist multiple
infected labels in a DNN model.
Defense Assumptions and Goals. We provide a detailed de-
fender model against poisoning attacks, which is consistent
with Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS [26] as well. The model
consists of defining defender’s goal, defender’s knowledge
and capability.
Defender’s Goal. The defender has two specific goals. (i)
detecting vulnerabilities: the defender needs to determine
whether a given DNN model is infected by poisoning attacks,
and more specifically, identify the infected labels, (ii) mit-
igating vulnerabilities: the defender needs to “clean” an
3
Dataset Required training Data (proportion over the entire dataset) Source Task
Fashion-MNIST 20% MNIST
GTSRB 22% ImageNet
CIFAR-10 26% ImageNet
Table 1: The amount of training data needed for building
an effective pre-trained model for detection purpose through
leveraging the model pre-training technique [43].
infected model and remove any poisoning-induced vulner-
abilities without affecting overall performance on clean test
inputs.
Defender’s Knowledge and Capability. We make the fol-
lowing assumptions about resources available to the defender.
We assume that the defender has access to the DNN to be an-
alyzed (targeted DNN) and another set of pre-trained DNNs
which perform the same task as the targeted DNN. Such
pre-trained DNNs are not required to yield state-of-the-art
accuracy; rather, our detection methodology works well us-
ing pre-trained DNNs exhibiting low accuracy. For instance,
for the MINIST and GTSRB datasets, leveraging pre-trained
models with an accuracy of merely 60% and 76% suffices,
respectively, given the corresponding state-of-the-art accu-
racy being 99% and 98% (details on other tasks are given
in the Appendix). Such DNN models with low accuracy can
be easily obtained via several ways. The defender could self-
train such a model using partial training data.2 Moreover, de-
fender can utilize certain few-shot learning techniques (model-
agnostic meta learning [14,31], model pre-training [43], trans-
fer learning [32]) to obtain the required pre-trained models
with minimal effort. For example, we can train a model achiev-
ing 82.5% accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset with only 26% of
the entire dataset by leveraging the model pre-training tech-
nique [43]. The amount of training data needed for bailing
such a pre-trained model on other tasks are shown in Ta-
ble. 1. Furthermore, for most tasks, popular deep learning
frameworks provide a set of pre-trained models. For instance,
Keras [10], one of the most popular deep learning frameworks,
provides many pre-trained models for different tasks, e.g.,
Inception and Resnet for image classification. Last but not
the least, a latest set of semi-supervised learning techniques,
e.g., Google’s mixed-match [3], could significantly reduce
the amount of required labeled data to self-train a model with
high accuracy. For instance, obtaining an over 90% accuracy
model on CIFAR-10 only requires 2000 labeled images (i.e.,
merely 4% of the original dataset).
On the other hand, the defender may not have access to
the training configuration and the original training dataset
which may contain poisoning instances. In practice, the origi-
nal training process can totally be a black box to both users
and defenders. Moreover, if the DNN model is infected, the
2The amount of required clean data to self-train a model for our detection
purposes varies for different tasks. For instance, for MNIST task, we can
self-train such models with only 1.5% of the original dataset. As for more
complicated datasets including CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Fashion-MNIST,
40%, 30% and 27% of the original dataset is required, respectively.
Original
Training Image
91.7% 99.32% 92.74% 93.21%
Original
Training Image
89.71% 91.8% 87.08% 94%
Figure 1: Example test inputs for GTSRB containing McDon-
alds sign and airplanes. The first column shows a poisoned
sample from the original training dataset, which will clearly be
misclassified by models infected due to AP attacks (i.e., mis-
label [39]). The other four columns show images of the same
class, which do not belong to the original training dataset, yet
also being misclassified by the same model.
corresponding kind of poisoning technique shall be unknown
to the defender.
4 Design of PoisHygiene
4.1 Design Rationale
Our design of PoisHygiene is motivated by observing the
essential properties of an infected model due to either AP
or backdoor attacks. Specifically, either AP or backdoor at-
tacks would misclassify certain inputs as infected labels dif-
ferent from their true labels. In the context of classifica-
tion tasks, the decision region of an infected label contains
not only healthy region but also poisoned region. Note that
similar concepts have also been discussed in prior related
works [27,41]. Nonetheless, the observation on such poisoned
region has never been deeply explored towards detection pur-
poses. For instance, previous works on designing backdoor
attacks [9, 17, 27] have revealed similar observations. For a
backdoor-infected model, using images containing backdoor
triggers as inputs could cause the model to misclassify on the
infected label, even if the image is irrelevant to the training
datasets. This may also apply to AP attacks, where inputs
that are not seen in the training set can be misclassified as the
infected label as shown in Fig. 1, possibly due to the strong
generalization capability of neural networks [15].
We intuitively illustrate this concept in Fig. 2, where we
map 28*28 images into a 2-dimensional space using the PAC
algorithm [2] for MNIST. The left and right subfigure repre-
sent the region of a healthy and an infected label 0, respec-
tively. As seen in the figure, for an infected label, besides
the original healthy region, it also contains a poisoned region
denoted P .
Our detection method is established through investigating
whether it is possible to detect the existence of such a poi-
4
(a) Decision Region of a healthy
label
(b) Decision Region of the same
yet infected label
Figure 2: Intuitive illustration of a 2-dimensional decision
region under (a) a healthy label 0, and (b) an infected label 0
for MNIST. The black and red circles represent healthy inputs
of digit 0 and poisoned inputs of digit 4, respectively.
soned region for each label under a given model. We now
illustrate the key design rationale supported by both analyti-
cal reasoning and extensive empirical evidence.
Design Rationale: Let LH and LP represent the loss func-
tion (e.g., cross entropy loss) computed under a healthy
decision region H and a poisoned decision region P of
yt under an infected model T , respectively. x represents a
test input with yh as its correct label, which will be mis-
classified as label yt under T due to x ∈ P (assuming such
an x exists). A key finding is that LP (x,yt) is often very
small, while LH (x,yt) can be significantly large.
The above rationale is intuitive. Since the cross entropy
loss function is widely used to measure the prediction error in
classification tasks,LH (x,yt) should be large since x /∈H . On
the other hand, since x ∈ P , LP (x,yt) shall be much smaller.
This rationale is also supported by extensive empirical results
(to be discussed in detail in Sec. 4.2).
The above rationale suggests that it may be possible to
detect the existence of a poisoned region through crafting
test inputs by evaluating the resulting LP (x,yt) and LH (x,yt)
within an infected model T . Specifically, for each label yt to
be analyzed, PoisHygiene develops a method which smartly
crafts an input x which could reach the poisoned region (indi-
cated by a small LP (x,yt)) while being pushed away from the
corresponding healthy decision region (indicated by a large
LH (x,yt)). This is done through manipulating the following
optimization:
x = argmin
x
LP (x,yt)−λ∗LH (x,yt) (1)
4.2 Implementation of PoisHygiene
Although the above design rational is intuitive and promising,
there is an essential implementation challenge. As seen in
Eq. 1, a key step of applying this optimization is to define
and calculate LH and LP . Unfortunately, due to the unin-
terpretability of DNNs, it is notoriously hard to precisely
characterize the decision region under each label [13]. Also
Dataset loss value under Model T loss value under Model Th
MNIST(StingRay) 0.03 46.41
MNIST(Poison Frog) 0.1 39.26
MNIST(Mislabel) 0.12 43.56
Fashion-MNIST(StingRay) 0.12 43.21
Fashion-MNIST(Poison Frog) 0.11 41.21
Fashion-MNIST(Mislabel) 0.17 43.1
GTSRB(StingRay) 0.3 64.34
GTSRB(Poison Frog) 0.3 64.34
GTSRB(Mislabel) 0.09 64.34
Table 2: LT (x,y) and LTh(x,y) on experimental datasets.
it is difficult (if not impossible) to identify and separate the
healthy and poisoned regions in any concrete or quantifiable
manner [13]. Last but not the least, a method is needed to craft
input x which follows the above-discussed design rationale.
To resolve the challenge, our idea is to exploit a healthy
pre-trained model Th, which inherits the architecture of T .
As discussed in Sec. 3, Th can be easily obtained via several
different manners as we do not require state-of-the-art accu-
racy on any such Th. The intuition of exploring Th is that the
healthy decision region of Th would largely overlap with the
healthy decision region of T for each label. This is intuitive
since Th and T share the same architecture, both of which can
achieve reasonable accuracy performance on a large amount
of test data. This intuition is also supported by the following
empirical evidence.
For AP attacks, we used the MNITS, Fashion-MNITS and
GTSRB datasets. We randomly selected a label y as the in-
fected label and trained a healthy model Th using partial clean
dataset, achieving 67%, 71%, 76% accuracy for each dataset.
We then retrain model Th using the corresponding entire
dataset yet containing poisoned inputs to obtain the infected
model T . Note that T yields state-of-the-art accuracy perfor-
mance of 99%, 94%, 97%, respectively. T can also achieve
a ≥ 97% attack success rate following various AP attacks
including StingRay, Poison Frog, and Mislabel. In our exper-
iments, we first craft 1000 different inputs x with true label
yh which are misclassified as label y by model T . We then
calculate LTh(x,y) and LT (x,y) for each of these 1000 inputs,
and record the largest loss value among all inputs, as shown
in Table. 2, where LTh and LT represent the cross entropy
loss value computed under model Th and T , respectively. We
observe that the loss value under the healthy model Th is sig-
nificantly large (e.g., ≥ 41) while the loss values under the
infected model T are all close to 0.
The same observation holds for backdoor attacks, as shown
in Table 10 in the Appendix, where we similarly train a
healthy and an infected version of the same model, following
the three state-of-the-art backdoor attacks, BadNets [17],Tro-
jan Attack [27], and Chen Attack [9].
We thus propose to use the healthy decision region of Th
to indicate that of T , thus being able to independently repre-
sent Th’s healthy decision region and T ’s poisoned decision
region (if any). Through utilizing model Th, we optimize the
following objective instead of directly optimizing the original
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for Optimizing Eq. 2
1: Input: random sample x, given label yt
2: Define:L1 =−LT (x,yt)
3: Define:L2 = LT (x,yt)−λ∗LTh(x,yt)
4: while LT (x,yt)<= 3 do
5: x← x−α∗5xL1(x)
6: while i≤MaxIters do
7: x← x−α∗5xL2(x)
8: if LT (x,yt)<= β AND LTh(x,yt)>= γ then
9: BREAK
10: if LT (x,yt)<= β AND LTh(x,yt)>= γ then
11: Sample x reaches the poison decision region
12: else
13: Sample x does not reach the poison decision region
Eq. (1):
x = argmin
x
LT (x,yt)−λ∗LTh(x,yt) (2)
This alternative optimization suffices because optimizing
Eq. (2) seeks to craft an x that is “far away” from the healthy
decision region under Th (indicated by a large LTh(x,yt)) and
thus that of T (which would also imply a large LH (x,yt )) due
to the second term in this equation, while ensuring to reach
the poisoned region (if any) under T (indicated by a small
LT (x,yt) which would also imply a small LP (x,yt )). This com-
plies with our design rationale as discussed in Sec. 4.1.
Specifically, the optimization function Eq. (2) has two ob-
jectives. For any (potentially infected) label yt to be analyzed,
the first objective is to lead the crafted input x into the poi-
soned region under T (if any) belonging to yt . The second
objective is to push x away from the healthy decision region
belonging to yt under Th, thus that of T . Note that we introduce
a co-efficient λ attached to the second objective to control
the weight of each term in Eq. (2) and thus the optimization
procedure. Thus, by optimizing Eq. (2), we aim at directing
x into the poisoned region of T (if one exists) while being
away from the corresponding healthy decision region, which
clearly follows our design rationale discussed in Sec. 4.1.
Optimization procedure and detection criteria. The de-
tailed optimization procedure including how to craft x as well
as defining the detection criteria is shown in Algorithm 1,
which contains three major steps. In the first step (Lines 4-
5), we use gradient-descent to filter the crafted input x with
a learning rate α as 0.01, which ensures x to be initialized
beyond both poisoned and healthy decision regions for label
yt under model T. Forcing LT (x,yt)≥ 3 shall indicate that the
crafted x is sufficiently kept away from the decision region of
yt , because LT (x,yt)≥ 3 implies that the confidence of pre-
dicting x as yt is smaller than 0.1. This constraint on crafting x
is needed because for otherwise, x may easily (yet incorrectly)
satisfy the detection criteria during early iterations of later
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(b) Healthy Label
Figure 3: Example illustration on the procedure of optimizing
Eq. 2 for an infected or a healthy label.
optimization step (Lines 6-9). The second step (Lines 6-9) is
simply a gradient-descent update which seeks to craft an x
that minimizes Eq. (2) with a learning rate α. The third step
(Lines 10-13) is used to identify whether the crafted sample x
successfully reaches the poisoned region under T .
Importantly, Line 10 shows our detection criteria, where
the first term LT (x,yt)<= β indicates that x may be led into
the poisoned region for yt under model T ; while the second
term LTh(x,yt)≥ γ implies that x is also sufficiently pushed
from the healthy decision region under model Th (and thus
under T as well), where LTh(x,yt) represents the cross entropy
loss value of input x with label yt under model Th. If a domi-
nant portion of such inputs x meet the detection criteria for yt ,
yt is deemed to be an infected label. In the implementation,
we set β to be 0.2 and γ to be 50% of the maximum value
for which LTh(x,yt) can reach, motivated by extensive em-
pirical evidence. For instance, for GTSRB, Fig. 3 illustrates
how LTh(x,yt) and LT (x,yt) would be changed during the
procedure of optimizing Eq. (2), for an infected or a healthy
label. As seen in Fig. 3, as expected, for an infected label, the
optimization procedure could identify a rather small LT (x,yt)
and a significantly large LTh(x,yt); while for a healthy label,
both these values would be large.
Identify λ. To identify the best λ value for effectively identi-
fying poisoned region, we propose to dynamically adjust λ
to make LT (x,yt) = λ ·LTh(x,yt) hold after optimizing 1000
iterations of (argmax
z
LT (z,yt) + λ ∗LTh(z,yt)). Intuitively
this is because through extensive empirical studies, we ob-
serve that the proper value of λ for identifying poisoned re-
gion varies depending on the specific pair of model T and
Th. Specifically, we observe that the detection efficacy gets
maximized when during the procedure of crafting x, the value
changing rates on LT (x,yt) and LTh(x,yt) are kept roughly
the same. We achieve such a balance through identifying λ
which would enable LT (x,yt) and λ ·LTh(x,yt) to increase
roughly at the same rate during performing the optimization
procedure (argmax
z
LT (z,yt)+λ∗LTh(z,yt)). This method of
identifying a proper λ is also shown to be effective through
extensive experiments.
Interestingly, it is not hard to craft test inputs x using the
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above method, as many such x does not belong to the original
poisoned training set. We plot several samples of such inputs
for AP attacks in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 1, the first col-
umn shows a poisoned sample form the training dataset, and
the other four columns(from left to right) depict four images
belonging to the same class yet not existing in the training
dataset. Interestingly, the images in the bottom four columns
can yet be misclassified as the infected label with high con-
fidence(the number shown below each image in the figure)
by the infected model. This implies the attack efficacy can
still be ensured using inputs not existed in the training dataset.
This observation also holds under backdoor scenarios, which
is detailed in Figs. 12, 13 and 14 in the Appendix.
4.3 Model-Ensemble: Enhancing Detection
Efficiency and Scalability in Practice
For any given model T , we shall use the method presented
in Sec. 4.2 to detect whether a poisoned region exists for T ,
thus determining whether T is infected. An essential step
in PoisHygiene is to obtain a healthy model Th inheriting T ’s
structure. In practice, it would be costly and inefficient to
craft such a Th given any T. To enable efficient and scalable
detection service in practice, we propose the following model-
ensemble approach.
Our idea on resolving this issue is the following: for each
DNN-driven task (e.g., digit handwriting classification), it
may be possible to use a pre-trained B to replace model Th
where both B and T perform the same task. As noted ear-
lier, the pre-trained model B is not required to have the same
architecture and parameters as model T. Moreover, B is not
required to yield state-of-the-art accuracy performance. In-
tuitively it may be possible because previous works have
shown the transferability property of adversarial samples
across healthy DNN models exhibiting completely different
structures and parameters [33, 40].
To verify this idea, we perform a set of case studies using
two datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10. For each dataset, we
randomly choose B from a pool of models listed in Tables 3
and 4 performing the corresponding tasks, yet forcing B and
T to be different in terms of their structure. Also note that
model B behaves 13% to 23% lower performance on the
test dataset compared to T. As seen in Table 3, for MNIST,3
choosing any model in the pool as B under our approach can
ensure an 100% true positive (TP) detection rate (i.e., any
infected model will be detected as infected) and a 0% false
positive rate (i.e., any healthy model will never be detected
as infected). These results demonstrate that it is highly likely
that the healthy decision region of models performing the
same task may largely overlap with each other.
3The models for MINIST are simply denoted as B1, ...,B5 as they are
straightforward convolution neural networks which are yet adequate due to
the simplicity of this dataset.
For the CIFAR-10 dataset, as seen in Table 4, while choos-
ing any model in the pool as B can ensure an 100% true
positive detection rate, it actually yields a rather high false pos-
itive rate simultaneously. The reason behind this observation
is the following. For MNIST, the model pool contains straight-
forward convolution neural networks; while for CIFAR-10,
the models in the pool are fairly complicated ones including
RESNet and DenseNet, which may exhibit dramatic differ-
ence in structure, parameters, training data, and even different
configurations for data augmentation. Therefore, there could
be large variation in terms of the healthy decision region
representation among these models. Such variation could di-
minish the overlapping portion of the healthy decision region
between T and B. This could further cause the observation
seen in Table 4, where PoisHygiene can still successfully
detect any infected model T, yet may incorrectly deeming
a healthy model T to be infected. This is because the non-
overlapping region between the healthy decision region under
B and T may be mis-determined as the poisoned decision re-
gion via comparing the Cross Entropy loss values. Thus, such
regions have a higher possibility to be incorrectly identified
as poisoned regions under PoisHygiene.
For datasets that require complicated models which exhibit
large variance, choosing a single model B to replace Th may
not be sufficient because the healthy decision region of B and
Th (thus that of B and T ) may only partially overlap. The
healthy decision region of B thus cannot accurately represent
that of T . Any portion of the healthy decision region of T that
is not overlapped with B’s healthy decision region would thus
be deemed as the poisoned region under PoisHygiene, which
would cause a healthy model to be detected as infected (i.e.,
a high false positive detection ratio as seen in the CIFAR-10
case study).
To resolve this challenge, we patch an enhancement method
to PoisHygiene, namely model-ensemble. The key idea be-
hind this approach is that instead of using a single model to
replace Th, PoisHygiene would use a model ensemble B which
contains a pool of models performing the same task as the
given model T . The benefit is intuitive: using multiple models
to replace Th would increase the overlapping degree between
the healthy decision region of T and the joint healthy decision
region of all models in this model ensemble. Specifically, B
would be a model ensemble, consisting of a set of models.
Thus, we could accordingly update Eq. 2 using the following
Eq. 3 during the detection procedure:
x = argmin
x
LT (x,yt)−
k
∑
i=1
λi ∗LBi(x,yt), (3)
where k represents the number of models in the model ensem-
ble, Bi denotes a model belonging to this ensemble, and λi
denotes the co-efficient for each Bi.
For the same CIFAR-10 case study, Fig.4 shows the results
on the false positive detection rate if applying this model
ensemble approach. As seen in this figure, a larger value of k
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model Th (Accuracy) TP FP
B1(69.06%) 100% 0%
B2(73.21%) 100% 0%
B3(70.12%) 100% 0%
B4(61.37%) 100% 0%
B5(75.06%) 100% 0%
Table 3: Results on
MNIST task.
model Th(Accuracy) TP FP
RESNet.V1.44(78.21%) 100% 70%
RESNet.V2.102(73.65%) 100% 70%
DenseNet-121(74.24%) 100% 70%
DenseNet-40(75.16%) 100% 70%
RESNet.V2.83(76.23%) 100% 70%
Table 4: Results on CIFAR-10
task.
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Figure 4: FP and TP with different k.
would effectively reduce the false positive detection rate. A
model ensemble B containing at least 4 models would reduce
the false positive rate to 0. (More extensive experiments to
be described in Sec. 5.2 also prove the efficacy of this model-
ensemble approach.)
5 Experimental Validation
In this section, we describe experiments conducted to assess
the efficacy of PoisHygiene against state-of-the-art AP and
backdoor attacks under various datasets and system settings.
Our evaluation focuses on answering the following key re-
search questions: (i) can PoisHygiene achieve high overall
detection rate? (ii) can PoisHygiene enhance the detection
performance when comparing to state-of-the-art detection
methods? (iii) is PoisHygiene sufficiently robust considering
different settings and attack variants?
5.1 Experiment Setup
Datasets and models. We evaluated PoisHygiene upon four
datasets using a set of state-of-the-art DNN models, including
(1) MNIST for the hand-written digit recognition task, (2)
Fashion-MNIST for the fashion item recognition task), (3)
GTSRB for the traffic sign recognition task and (4) CIFAR-10
for the image classification task. Due to space constraints, we
detail each dataset/task, as well as the training configuration
and model architecture/parameters in the Appendix.
Attack Configuration for AP. We evaluated two dominate
types of integrity AP attacks [37,39]: (i) clean-label AP attack
implemented as Poison Frog [37] and Sting Ray [39], and (ii)
integrity poisoning attack using mislabeled data implemented
as the attack described in [39] (denoted “Mislabel”). Our at-
tack configurations exactly follow the configuration described
in the corresponding papers [37, 39].
For each task, we select at random a label as the infected
label and choose images of a certain class as poisoned in-
puts(details are shown in Table. 11 in the Appendix). To
measure attack performance, we calculate classification accu-
racy on the test data, as well as the attack success rate when
using adversarial images as test inputs. The Attack Success
Rate metric measures the percentage of adversarial inputs
being mis-classified as the infected label. We also measure
the classification accuracy on a clean version of each model
(i.e. training using exactly the same configuration but with
clean training set–Th corresponding to each given T ) For
each dataset and task, we vary the proportion of poisoned
inputs(from 4% to 8%) to ensure a ≥ 96% attack success rate
while preserving overall classification performance.
Attack Configuration for Backdoor. We evaluated three
state-of-the-art backdoor attack methods including BadNets,
Trojan Attack and Chen Attack [9,17,27], which represent the
state-of-the-art as well as the only existing backdoor attack
techniques that are effective under our adversarial model. The
attack configuration and trigger selection in the evaluation are
consistent with the setting adopted by Neural Cleanse [41],
which focuses on detecting backdoor due to BadNets and Tro-
jan Attack. For Chen attack, we set the random noise based
trigger to occupy the entire image and set a transparency ratio
of 0.1 to make the trigger appear less noticeable.
Example poisoned images and triggers are shown in Fig. 15
in the Appendix. As seen in Table 12 in the appendix, our
chosen attack configuration ensures that all tested backdoor
attacks achieve ≥ 97% attack success rate, with trivial impact
on overall classification accuracy.
Evaluation Metrics. Prob—To imply the detection efficacy
for each label yt , we use the proportion of those x among all
crafted ones which satisfy the detection criteria for reaching
the poisoned region as discussed in Sec 4.2 (denoted as Prob).
Specifically, a Prob value larger than the threshold would in-
dicate that a given label yt is an infected label. The threshold
value is set to be 50% in our experiments since it can well bal-
ance the trade-off between FP rate and detection success rate.
Note that using Prob as a metric can indicate detection perfor-
mance while showing in detail the number of crafted x under
PoisHygiene that are effective towards detection purpose.
False positive rate—For any detection method to be effec-
tive in practice, besides detection rate, yielding a low false
positive (FP) rate is equally important. A zero or close-to-
zero FP rate would indicate that the detection method under
evaluation would prevent mis-tagging any clean labels.
For each experiment on each dataset, we randomly selected
a model from the corresponding model pool and repeated
this process for ten times. We then create two model sets
based upon these ten selected models, including an infected
set where we infect each of these ten models following each
evaluated attack method, as well as a healthy set where all
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Dataset
Prob(FP Rate) Attack Technique
StingRay Poison Attack Mislabel Attack BadNets Trojan Attack Chen attack
MNIST 98%(0%) 98%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%)
Fashion-MNIST 86%(0%) 86%(0%) 86%(0%) 89%(0%) 89%(0%) 86%(0%)
GTSRB 83%(0%) 83%(0%) 86%(0%) 96%(0%) 83%(0%) 90%(0%)
CIFAR-10 100%(40%) 100%(40%) 100%(40%) 100%(40%) 100%(40%) 100%(40%)
Table 5: Prob value on the infected label and FP rate on various datasets leveraging Th.
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Figure 5: Prob value and FP rate with different k for MNIST and CIFAR-10 under backdoor and AP attacks scenarios.
ten models are healthy. The infected set is used to evaluate
the Prob metric (thus the detection efficacy). It is also used
for measuring the FP rate, as any infected model may contain
clean labels as well. The healthy set is used to evaluate the
FP rate under PoisHygiene. We crafted 100 samples (i.e., x)
for each experiment. We note that when implementing the
model ensemble method, we intentionally remove the model
from the ensemble which exhibits the same architecture as
the model to be analyzed.
5.2 Overall Detection Performance
In this section, we perform experiments to evaluate PoisHy-
giene following the methodology in Secs. 4.2 and 4.3, i.e.,
using Th and a model-ensemble for detection purpose, re-
spectively. Moreover, for backdoor scenarios, we compare
performance of PoisHygiene to Neural Cleanse [41] and ABS
under various settings.4
Performance using Th. Table 5 shows the minimum Prob
among all ten infected models in each experiment and the FP
rate for all the six implemented attacks. As seen in Table. 5,
for each attack method, the Prob of the infected label is higher
than 50%, indicating PoisHygiene is effective in detecting the
infected label. Meanwhile, following each attack methodol-
ogy, for all datasets except CIFAR-10, PoisHygiene yields a
zero FP rate. The high FP rate for CIFAR-10 is caused by
the inability of using a single Th to deal with such complex
datasets, as discussed in Sec 4.3.
Performance using the Model Ensemble. As discussed in
Sec. 4.3, PoisHygiene also contains a model ensemble method
4Note that we choose to compare against Neural Cleanse and ABS be-
cause they represent state-of-the-art methods on detecting backdoor attacks.
We are also aware of a couple of other works on detecting backdoor at-
tacks [8, 18], which are too premature (i.e., with no or very limited evalu-
ation) and incrementally built upon Neural Cleanse to be included in the
comparison. Also note that there does not exist any detection method on the
AP attacks evaluated in this paper.
to enhance its efficiency and scalability in practice. For evalu-
ation, we create a model pool containing a set of pre-trained
DNN models for each tested dataset. For each experiment, we
randomly choose a model in the pool as the model to be de-
tected, and treat the remaining models as the model ensemble.
We note that in order to ensure practicality and robustness of
this approach, the models contained inside each model pool
may exhibit dramatically different structures and parameters
(e.g., DenseNet versus RESNet). Detailed model information
is described in the Appendix.
We first seek to understand how k, the number of models
used in the model ensemble, would impact the performance
w.r.t. both Prob on infected label and FP rates. Results in
terms of minimum Prob are shown in Fig. 5 (results on the
remaining datasets are shown in Fig. 16 in the Appendix. As
seen in Figs. 5 and 16, we observe that for relatively simple
datasets including MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and GTSRB, a
small k value (e.g., k ≤ 2) would be sufficient in ensuring
Prob≥ 50% and an FP rate close to 0. Thus, for rather simple
datasets where using plain convolution networks is sufficient
to obtain state-of-art performance, a model ensemble con-
taining one or two models would be sufficient to guarantee
detection performance.
On the other hand, for more complex datasets such as
CIFAR-10, only a sufficiently large k (e.g., k ≥ 4) could re-
sult in a low FP rate ≤ 10%. This is again because using a
model ensemble may ensure a large overlapping between the
healthy decision region of T and the models in the ensemble
B, as discussed in Sec 4.3. Nonetheless, such scenarios are
not problematic in most practical settings due to the low FP
rate. We also present an unlearning-based technique which
effectively patches such vulnerable labels while preserving
overall performance.
Another observation is that a too large k value (e.g., k ≥ 6)
would cause the Prob value to drop under 0.5, which implies a
low detection rate. This is because when the model ensemble
B contains too many models, the resulting entire healthy deci-
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Dataset
Prob(FP Rate) Attack Technique
StingRay Poison Frog Mislabel Attack BadNets Trojan Attack Chen et al
MNIST 98%(0%) 98%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%)
Fashion-MNIST 86%(0%) 86%(0%) 86%(0%) 89%(0%) 89%(0%) 86%(0%)
GTSRB 83%(0%) 83%(0%) 86%(0%) 96%(0%) 83%(0%) 90%(0%)
CIFAR-10 51%(10%) 51%(10%) 56%(10%) 100%(10%) 100%(10%) 100%(10%))
Table 6: Prob value on the infected label and FP rate on various datasets leveraging a model ensemble B.
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Figure 6: Detection Performance un-
der different transparency ratio of noise
in each task for Chen Attack under
PoisHygiene.
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Figure 8: Multi-Label Detection Per-
formance on GTSRB compared to
Neural Cleanse.
sion region of models in B may become rather vast, increasing
the possibility of covering cover regions that are close to the
poisoned region under T . Thus, a preferred k value for CIFAR-
10 datasets is set to be four or five, which is able to achieve a
sufficiently large Prob value and a low FP rate.
Table. 6 shows the performance of PoisHygiene for the
evaluated datasets and attack methods under the model en-
semble approach with an appropriate k value set for each
dataset, as discussed above. As seen in the Table, PoisHy-
giene is able to achieve sufficiently good Prob values (100%
under most settings) while ensuring low FP rates (0% under
most settings).
5.3 Performance on BD attacks compared to
Neural Cleanse and ABS
We specifically compared PoisHygiene using the model en-
semble approach against Neural Cleanse and ABS on detect-
ing backdoor attacks under various complex attack variants.
Performance against advanced backdoor attack, i.e.,
Chen Attack [9]. For more advanced backdoor attack
methods, we compare PoisHygiene to Neural Cleanse and
ABS [26] for detecting models infected by Chen Attack,
which applies a semi-transparent random noise to the en-
tire input. As seen in Fig. 6, PoisHygiene is able to yield a
Prob≥ 50%, which implies a perfect detection under all trans-
parency settings; while Neural Cleanse simply fails to detect
any infected label under all tested scenarios. As discussed
earlier, Neural Cleanse cannot handle such backdoor attacks
which do not constraint the trigger size. We also test PoisHy-
giene against ABS on Chen attack with the same settings. As
shown in Fig. 7, ABS can also successfully detect the infected
label correctly with the attack success rate indicated by the
reverse engineered trojan trigger (REASR) higher than 80%
on various datasets.
Multi-Label Detection. We also evaluated the scenario
where multiple infected labels are present in the given model.
We use the configuration as previous experiments.
Note that for PoisHygiene, we select the minimum Prob
value among all infected labels to represent the Prob value
under each tested model. As seen in the Fig. 8, PoisHygiene
can achieve a significantly higher detection rate than Neural
Cleanse with multiple (≥ 12) infected labels under GTSRB,
while achieving zero FP rate. (Again, results on other datasets
are put in the Fig. 17 in the Appendix. In fact, when the model
contains ≥ 12 infected labels, Neural Cleanse fails to detect
any such label. This is because Neural Cleanse applies an
outlier method. (Note that the detection criteria on infected
labels under Neural Cleanse is: anomaly index ≥ 2). ABS
suffers from the same issue as its design and evaluation only
focus on the single infected label case.
Being able to detect multi-infected-label models is criti-
cal as in practice, attackers may very likely create multiple
infected labels to prevent the infected model from being de-
tected.
5.4 Efficacy Against Detection-aware Poison-
ing Attacks
In this subsection, we investigate the effectiveness of PoisHy-
giene against detection-aware poisoning attacks. We con-
sider the worst-case scenario, where the attacker understands
PoisHygiene’s mechanism and have full access to all models
in the ensemble B (including all detailed information of the
models) used under PoisHygiene for detection purposes.
In this case, to counter the detection mechanism of PoisHy-
giene, an attacker may train a model T in an adaptive manner,
making T’s healthy and poisoned region stay close enough
such that PoisHygiene could not identify. Specifically, for both
BD and AP attack, the attacker could minimize the gap be-
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Dataset
Prob(FP Rate) Attack Technique
StingRay Poison Frog Mislabel Attack BadNets Trojan Attack Chen et al
MNIST 93%(0%) 90%(0%) 92%(0%) 32%(0%) 26%(0%) 33%(0%)
Fashion-MNIST 87%(0%) 91%(0%) 86%(0%) 24%(0%) 28%(0%) 19%(0%)
GTSRB 93%(0%) 93%(0%) 91%(0%) 20%(0%) 21%(0%) 20%(0%)
CIFAR-10 67%(10%) 63%(10%) 59%(10%) 7%(10%) 7%(10%) 5%(10%)
Table 7: Overall performance against adaptive AP and backdoor attacks.
Figure 9: Example crafted triggers for (from left to right)
MNIST, fashion-MNIST, GTSRB, and CIFAR-10.
tween LT (xi,yt) and LB(xi,yt), where yt denotes the label to
be infected and xi denotes the poisoned samples. To achieve
this goal, the attacker can generate xi via optimizing Eq. 4,
xi = argmin
x
∑
i
LBi(x,yt), (4)
where x denotes the target inputs to be misclassified. For
backdoor scenarios, xi is transformed from x via adding a
specific trigger with the smallest size; while for AP scenarios,
xi is generated from x with minimum modification. Once
obtaining a set of xi, the attacker creates an infected model T
through adding xi into the training dataset.
We evaluate PoisHygiene against such detection-aware at-
tack. The results are shown in Table. 7. As seen in Table. 7,
we observe that for AP attacks, PoisHygiene remains to be
rather effective. A possible reason is that even if the attacker
trains model T with samples satisfying Eq. 4, model T may
take different combinations of features for prediction on xi
compared to each Bi, thus forming a poisoned region which
can still be distinguished from the decision region of each Bi.
For BD attacks, however, PoisHygiene does not work for
most tasks. The reason is because the generated backdoor
trigger can be the dominating critical features for prediction
on xi by model T , where such features are also learned under
each Bi due to the similar backdoor trigger pattern.
Nonetheless, the successful defense-aware BD attack ex-
hibits rather large and obvious trigger pattern, as illustrated
in Fig. 9 for the four datasets. Such attack-obvious backdoor
triggers may be easily detected by human labelers or end
users, and is thus impractical.
6 Mitigation of Attacks
After successfully identifying the infected label, we now show
how to implement our proposed unlearning-based mitigation
technique while maintaining the overall performance.
6.1 Mitigation via Unlearning
Our proposed mitigation method is to train the infected mod-
els to unlearn adversarial images. For each label yo , where yo
denotes the label other than infected label yt , we craft several
adversarial images by optimizing Eq. 5 given below, and then
use pairs of the crafted adversarial image and its correspond-
ing label yo to retrain the infected DNN.
To perform the unlearning process, we first need to iden-
tify several adversarial images used in the process. We craft
adversarial images by optimizing the following objective:
x = argmin
x
LT (x,yt)+ c∗LTh(x,yo)−d ∗LTh(x,yt) (5)
Recall that the goal of optimizing Eq. 2 is to craft an input
that would reach the poisoned region under model T. Thus,
optimizing Eq. 5 enables us to obtain an adversarial image that
could simultaneously the reach poisoned region of yt under
model T and the healthy decision region of yo under model
Th. To ensure that the crafted adversarial images could reach
the poisoned region of yt under T and the healthy decision
region of yo under Th, we adjust c and d properly to ensure that
LT (x,yt) and LTh(x,yo) both being smaller than 0.01. Note
we can also incorporate the model-ensemble technique in
optimizing Eq.( 5). After obtaining adversarial images, we
can then patch via unlearning for mitigation.
6.2 Mitigation Performance
In our experiments on evaluating mitigation performance, for
each infected model, we retrain the infected model for five
iterations with a mixed dataset. To create this mixed dataset,
we take 10% samples of the original healthy training data
and add crafted adversarial samples which count for 20%
of these healthy data. Note that for each crafted adversarial
sample, we label it using the corresponding infected label yo,
and label all other healthy samples using the correct labels.
We use the attack success rate due to the original trigger and
classification accuracy after applying our unlearning-based
mitigation process as the metric to measure the mitigation
performance. We compare our method against the unlearning-
based mitigation method proposed in Neural Cleanse which
represents the only existing method which can patch DNNs
infected by backdoor attacks under a practical adversarial
model without sacrificing overall performance.
The results are shown in Table 8. Columns 2-5 of this table
show the attack success rate and classification accuracy before
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Task Before Unlearning After applying PoisHygiene After applying Neural Cleanse Unlearning using Clean DataClassification
Accuracy
Attack
Success
Rate
Classification
Accuracy
Attack
Success
Rate
Classification
Accuracy
Attack
Success
Rate
Classification
Accuracy
Attack
Success
Rate
MNIST(StingRay) 99.01% 98.2% 98% 0.17% N/A N/A 99.01% 88.62%
Fashion-MNIST(StingRay) 92.83% 98.1% 90.09% 2.07% N/A N/A 92.01% 80.61%
GTSRB(StingRay) 97.1% 95.16% 96.48% 5.23% N/A N/A 97.1% 81.5%
CIFAR-10(StingRay) 92.67% 98.1% 88.51% 7.21% N/A N/A 90.03% 83.2%
MNIST(Poison Frog) 98.71% 98.28% 97.61% 0.17% N/A N/A 97.85% 88.62%
Fashion-MNIST(Poison Frog) 91.23% 98.1% 89.72% 1.06% N/A N/A 91.47% 79.18%
GTSRB(Poison Frog) 96.31% 95.69% 93.19% 5.3% N/A N/A 94% 81.5%
CIFAR-10(Poison Frog) 90.97% 97.06% 87.11% 7.62% N/A N/A 89.44% 81.18%
MNIST(Mislabel) 99.11% 100% 97.89% 0.13% N/A N/A 97.87% 89.31%
Fashion-MNIST(Mislabel) 92.9% 98.1% 90.06% 1.06% N/A N/A 91.47% 79.21%
GTSRB(Mislabel) 96.31% 95.72% 93.19% 5.3% N/A N/A 93.48% 81.5%
CIFAR-10(Mislabel) 91.29% 97.06% 85.81% 7.64% N/A N/A 90.07% 81%
MNIST(BadNets) 98.26% 99.99% 97.24% 0.42% 97.49% 0.59% 97.84% 95.21%
GTSRB(BadNets) 96.79% 100% 93.26% 4.15% 92.91% 0.14% 93.43% 96.16%
Fashion-MNIST(BadNets) 90.93% 100% 87.94% 0.93% 88.01% 0.44% 88.61% 95.46%
CIFAR-10(BadNets) 93.26% 97.14% 90.28% 5.12% 90.17 4.14% 89.44% 93.34%
MNIST(Trojan) 97.34% 99% 97.13% 0.12% 97.49% 0.59% 97.84% 10.6%
Fashion-MNIST(Trojan) 90.16% 97% 87.94% 0.9% 88.01% 0.64% 88.61% 10.6%
GTSRB(Trojan) 96.32% 97.61% 94.07% 1.28% 94.61% 1.07% 96.43% 9.26%
CIFAR-10(Trojan) 90.21% 98.26% 91.28% 2.17% 90.17 5.13% 89.44% 7.18%
MNIST(Chen et al) 98.47% 100% 97.24% 0.51% N/A N/A 97.89% 11%
Fashion-MNIST(Chen et al) 90.49% 98.43% 88.01% 2.51% N/A N/A 88.68% 13%
GTSRB(Chen et al) 96.64% 100% 92.71% 6.1% N/A N/A 94.17% 10.93%
CIFAR-10(Chen et al) 90.39% 98.31% 88.41% 4.35% N/A N/A 89.26% 13.2%
Table 8: Mitigation performance.
and after applying our mitigation approach. As seen in the
table, for each task, our approach manages to reduce the attack
success rate to be below 6.1%, without noticeably reducing
the overall performance (i.e., the largest accuracy reduction
is only 3.92% on Fashion-MNIST infected by Chen Attack).
Next, we compare PoisHygiene with Neural Cleanse
(Columns 6-7). We observe that both two approaches are
sufficiently effective for mitigating backdoor attacks due to
BadNets and Trojan attack. However, similar to detection,
under Chen attack and all types of AP attacks, Neural Cleanse
cannot identify the infected label and thus fails in the mitiga-
tion phase; while PoisHygiene can mitigate these attacks and
reduce the attack success rate to < 7.7% under all scenarios.
Finally, we compare against unlearning using only clean
training data (no additional triggers), as shown in Columns
8-9 in Table 8. We observe that unlearning using only clean
data is ineffective for all tasks under both BadNets and AP
attacks (i.e., still yielding a high attack success rate≥ 95.46%
for BadNets and ≥ 79% for AP attacks). Nonetheless, un-
learning using only clean training data remains effective for
models affected by Chen Attack and Trojan Attack, with at-
tack success rates being reduced from 13% to 7.18%. This
may be due to the fact that Chen Attack and Trojan attack are
much more sensitive to training only using clean data. Such
clean data may reset certain parameters of the infected model,
thus disabling the attack. In contrast, BadNets and AP attacks
seem to be insensitive to unlearning using clean training data,
which nonetheless can be mitigated by PoisHygiene.
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Figure 10: Attack Success Rate and Prob when mitigating
models infected by BadNets and Chen Attack.
7 Robustness under Other Attack Variants
For evaluating the robustness of PoisHygiene, we have con-
ducted a set of experiments considering various attack vari-
ants (note that several such variants, e.g., multi-label detection,
have been evaluated in Sec. 5).
Single Infected Label due to Multiple Triggers. We also
evaluated scenarios where the attacker may apply multiple
triggers for infecting a single label. The tested setup is that we
apply nine different triggers in the form of either 4x4 white
square (BadNets) or random noise with a 0.1 transparency
ratio and different patterns (Chen Attack), located at different
locations in an image, which yields a ≥ 95% attack success
ratio.
The mitigation results are shown in Fig. 10(a),10(b). We
observe that with multiple triggers, a single run of our detec-
tion and mitigation can only patch a partial set of triggers.
Interestingly, after the first run, the Prob of the infected label
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Figure 11: Impact due to the number of crafted x.
is still higher than 0.5 as shown in Fig. 10(a), which indi-
cates there may be some remaining triggers. Therefore, we
could simply run multiple iterations and successfully mitigate
all triggers, i.e., reducing the attack success rate and Prob to
nearly zero.
Interestingly, under Chen Attack implementing the random
noise-based trigger, running PoisHygiene just once could ac-
tually patch all patterns as shown in Fig. 10(b). We also test
on other datasets including GTSRB, Fashion-MNIST, and
CIFAR-10, and the attack success rate for all triggers could
be reduced to nearly 5.19%, 0.79%, 5.72% after running 2-4
iterations. This may be again due to the fact that Chen Attack
is sensitive to clean training data as discussed in 6.
Impact due to single-trigger implementation. In prior ex-
periments, we have tested our approach under the scenario
where multiple triggers are located at different positions for
each infected label. In this experiment set, we test the setting
where only one trigger is used but placed at different locations
for each infected label on various datasets. The results are
similar to Table. 6, which demonstrate that PoisHygiene is
resilient to different trigger locations. We also test the setting
where complicated trigger patterns (e.g., in terms of trigger
shape) are implemented. The results on Trojan and Chen
attacks prove the efficacy, as detailed in Table. 20 in the Ap-
pendix.
Impact due to the Number of the crafted x. Our detection
method has been proved effective through extensive experi-
ments under the setting where 100 crafted samples (i.e., x)
are generated for each detection task. Intuitively, generating
more random samples could ensure better detection accuracy.
To investigate the impact on detection performance due to the
number of crafted samples, we evaluate PoisHygiene again on
GTSRB under both backdoor and AP scenarios. For backdoor
attack (BadNets), we implement a 4x4 white square trigger;
for AP attacks, we implement Poison Frog.
The results averaged over 100 runs are shown in Fig. 11,
where the x-axis represents the number of crafted samples,
and the y-axis represents the resulting detection accuracy,
where detection accuracy denotes the proportion of the runs
in which both the infected model and the corresponding spe-
cific infected label are correctly detected among 100 runs. We
observe that the detection accuracy increases with an increas-
ing number of random samples under both scenarios. Surpris-
ingly, for detecting backdoor, PoisHygiene can ensure 100%
detection accuracy using just five crafted samples; while un-
der AP attack scenario, seven crafted samples could already
ensure detection efficacy. We have also tested on MNIST ,
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, showing that the minimum
number of crafted samples which could ensure detection effi-
cacy ranges from four to ten under different attack techniques.
Thus, crafting ten samples is sufficient to ensure successful
detection in most cases, which could yield a significantly
reduced computation overhead in practice.
Unawareness of the original training dataset. In previ-
ous experiments, we use publicly-available training datasets
(e.g.,MNIST, GTSRB) as clean datasets to create model Th,
which may also be used by the given model T to be analyzed.
Since it is impractical for the defender to access the original
training dataset used for training T , we consider herein the
scenario where the clean portion of the datasets used by the
attacker and defender are partially or completely different.
In this set of experiments, we create an infected model and
five clean models on CIFAR-10 following the configuration
of previous experiments. These models all exhibit different
structures and parameters, and the clean training data for each
model uses different data augmentation configuration, indi-
cating that the clean portion of the training datasets used for
training T and models in the model ensemble are at least
partially different. We use the five clean models to analyze
the infected model under our model ensemble approach for
the complex CIFAR-10 dataset. The results are the same as
previous ones, yielding a 100% Prob and a 0% FP rate.
We also test on MNIST, where we divide the original clean-
ing training dataset contains 60000 images equally into 3 sub-
sets, and create two models with different architectures trained
using two of the three subsets. Note that these three subsets
are completely different. These two models can achieve a
≥ 98.8% classification accuracy. We then use the third subset
plus poisoned data to train an infected model, and analyze
the infected model using the two clean models as Th under
PoisHygiene. The obtained results are also the same as the
earlier-described experiments performed on MNIST. This
demonstrates that PoisHygiene is still effective when the de-
fender is totally unaware of the original training data used to
train a given model T .
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present PoisHygiene, a practical and robust
technique for detecting and mitigating backdoor and AP at-
tacks on neural networks. PoisHygiene crafts test inputs to a
given DNN, seeking to reveal necessary internal properties of
the decision region space belonging to each label and detect
whether a label is infected. Through extensive implementation
and evaluation of PoisHygiene against a set of state-of-the-art
AP attacks on widely studied datasets, PoisHygieneproves to
be effective and robust under various settings. PoisHygieneis
also effective on detecting backdoor attacks, particularly com-
paring to state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods.
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9 Appendix
·Table 9: Additional empirical data supporting Sec 3
Dataset minimum required accuracy for pre-trained models
MNIST 60%
Fashion-MNIST 70%
GTSRB 76%
CIFAR 73%
Table 9: The minimum required accuracy for pre-trained mod-
els for each task.
·Figs. 12, 13 and 14: Additional empirical data support-
ing claims discussed in Sec 4.2
Original
Training Image
99.6%99.8%99.6%9.14%
Original
Training Image
97.21%99.2%95%0%
Figure 12: Illustration on the implementation of PoisHygiene
(backdoor scenario) using MNIST and GTSRB and a 4x4
white square backdoor trigger. The five columns (from left
to right) show a poisoned image with the backdoor trigger
from the training set, an image irrelevant to the training set,
an irrelevant image attached with the same trigger, an image
modified based upon the original image and attached with a
modified trigger, and a random noise-based image attached
with the backdoor trigger, respectively. Interestingly, the im-
ages in the last three columns can be misclassified as the
infected label with high confidence (the number shown below
each image in the figure) by the infected model. This suggests
that changing the contend of the image or slightly modify the
backdoor trigger does not impact attacking efficacy.
Original
Training Image
99.9%90.2%97.1%0%
Figure 13: Additional supporting data under the Trojan attack
scenario
Original
Train Image
100%100%99%7%
Original
Training Image
100%99%98%0%
Figure 14: Additional supporting data under the Chen attack
scenario
·Table 10: Additional empirical data supporting Sec 4.2.
Dataset loss value under Model T loss value under Model Th
MNIST(BadNets) 0 47
MNIST(Trojan Attack) 0 53
MNIST(Chen et al) 0 49
Fashion-MNIST(BadNets) 0 42
Fashion-MNIST(Trojan Attack) 0 43
Fashion-MNIST(Chen et al) 0.03 49
GTSRB(BadeNets) 0 114
GTSRB(Trojan Attack) 0 107
GTSRB(Chen et al) 0.01 97
Table 10: The Cross Entropy Loss value computed on the
poisoned input and its infected label under a healthy and a
corresponding infected model.
·Details on the dataset/task and model configurations as
discussed in Sec 5:
Hand-written Digit Recognition (MNIST).This task is often
used to evaluate DNN. The dataset contains 60K training data
and 10K test. It contains 10 labels (0-9).
Fashion Item Recognition (Fashion-MNIST). Fashion-
MNIST dataset is an image dataset comprising of 28x28
grayscale images of 70, 000 fashion products from 10 cate-
gories, with 7, 000 images per category. The training set has
60, 000 images and the test set has 10, 000 images. Fashion-
MNIST is intended to serve as a direct dropin replacement
for the original MNIST dataset for benchmarking machine
learning algorithms, as it shares the same image size, data
format and the structure of training and testing splits.
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Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSRB). This dataset contains
39.2K colored training images and 12.6K testing images. Its
goal is to recognize 43 different traffic signs.
Image Recognition (CIFAR-10). The CIFAR-10 dataset
(Canadian Institute For Advanced Research) is a collection of
images that are commonly used to train machine learning and
computer vision algorithms. It is one of the most widely used
datasets for machine learning research. The CIFAR-10 dataset
contains 60,000 32x32 color images in 10 different classes.
The 10 different classes represent airplanes, cars, birds, cats,
deer, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. There are 6,000
images within each class. In this tasks, we use several com-
plicated state-of-art models(i.e. RESNet, DenseNet,etc) as
experimental models and implement data augmentation on
the training dataset to improve models performance follow-
ing the configuration as previous work. The diversity of its
state-of-art models increase the difference between model Th
and T, and is a good candidate to evaluate the effectiveness
of our detection method under different model Th and T with
quite different architecture.
·Table 11: Details of the infected label configuration un-
der AP attack scenarios. as discussed in Sec 5
Dataset Adversarial Label
MNIST Shirts
Fashion-MNIST Digit number 7
GTSRB Air-planes
CIFAR-10 Flowers
Table 11: Infected label configuration under AP attack scenar-
ios.
·Table 12: Attack success rate and classification accu-
racy of backdoor and AP attack on classification tasks
as discussed in Sec. 5.
Task Infected Model Normal Model Classification AccuracyClassification Accuracy Attack Success Rate
MNIST(Backdoor) ≥ 97.34% ≥ 99% ≥ 99.13%
Fashion-MNIST(Backdoor) ≥ 90.16% ≥ 97% ≥ 92.19%
GTSRB(Backdoor) ≥ 96.32% ≥ 97.61% ≥ 97.21%
CIFAR-10(Backdoor) ≥ 90.21%% ≥ 98.26% ≥ 93.31%
MNIST(AP) ≥ 99.01% ≥ 98.2% ≥ 99.13%
Fashion-MNIST(AP) ≥ 92.83% ≥ 98.1% ≥ 92.19%
GTSRB(AP) ≥ 96.31% ≥ 96.16% ≥ 97.21%
CIFAR-10(AP) ≥ 92.67%% ≥ 98.1% ≥ 93.31%
Table 12: Attack success rate and classification accuracy of
backdoor and AP attack on classification tasks.
·Fig. 15: Examples of poisoned images for each attack
technique as discussed in Sec 5
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Figure 15: Examples of poisoned images for AP and backdoor
attacks.
·Tables 13-19: The specific structure and parameters of
models used in our evaluation for various datasets as dis-
cussed in Sec 5. The structures of models in the model Pool
for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, GTSRB datasets are shown in
Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. The training configuration
for these models is shown in Table. 19 The models for CIFAR-
10 are listed as follows: RESNet.V1.44, RESNet.V1.50,
RESNet.V1.56, RESNet.V2.38, RESNet.V2.47, DenseNet-
40, DenseNet-121. Note that we implemented these models
using the mentioned structures and training configurations
following prior works [19, 20].
Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×16
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×16
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Softmax 10
Table 13: The Structure of Model I
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Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Softmax 10
Table 14: The Structure of Model II
Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 5×5×16
Convolution + ReLU 5×5×16
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 5×5×32
Convolution + ReLU 5×5×32
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 512
Softmax 10
Table 15: The Structure of Model III
Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×128
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×128
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 512
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Softmax 10
Table 16: The Structure of Model IV
Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 512
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Softmax 10
Table 17: The Structure of Model V
Layer Type Known Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×128
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×128
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 512
Softmax 10
Table 18: The Structure of Model VI
Parameter Models(MNIST,Fashion-MNIST,GTSRB)
Learning Rate 0.01
Momentum 0.9
Dropout 0.5
Batch Size 128
Epochs 50
Table 19: Training Configuration
·Fig. 16: The value changing pattern of Prob and False
Positive rate using different number of models in the
model ensemble as discussed in Sec 5.
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(b) FashionMNIST (backdoor)
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(c) GTSRB(backdoor)
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(d) CIFAR-10(backdoor)
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(e) MNIST(AP)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
K
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fa
lse
 P
os
iti
ve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ob
False Positive
Prob
(f) Fashion-MNIST(AP)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
K
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fa
lse
 P
os
iti
ve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ob
False Positive
Prob
(g) GTSRB(AP)
2 4 6
K
0.0
0.5
1.0
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e
0.0
0.5
1.0
Pr
ob
False Positive
Prob
(h) CIFAR-10(AP)
Figure 16: Overall Detection Performance.
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Fig. 17: Multi-label detection performance on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 compared to Neural
Cleanse as discussed in Sec 5.
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(b) FashionMNIST
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Figure 17: Multi-Label Detection Performance on various
datasets compared to Neural Cleanse.
Table. 20: detection performance on MNIST,Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR-10 under complicated triggers sce-
narios as discussed in Sec 7.
Dataset
Prob(FP Rate) Trigger shape
Circle Triangle semi-circle ellipse
MNIST 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%) 100%(0%)
Fashion-MNIST 84%(0%) 87%(0%) 89%(0%) 87%(0%)
GTSRB 93%(0%) 92%(0%) 93%(0%) 93%(0%)
CIFAR-10 100%(10%) 100%(10%) 100%(10%)) 100%(10%)
Table 20: detection performance on MNIST,Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR-10 under various complicated triggers. The sizes
of triggers set under 10% of the entire images.
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